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ABSTRACT: A robot that is functionally indistinguishable 
from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will 
never be any way to know, yet its functional principles 
will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind.
Let us not mince words. The difference between something that is and is not conscious is that 
something's home in something that's conscious, something experiencing experiences, feeling feelings, 
perhaps even, though not necessarily, thinking thoughts. Don't be lured into details about "self-
awareness" and "intentionality." If there's something home in there, something hurting when pinched, 
then that's a mind and we are faced squarely with two age-old philosophical problems:
The first is: How can we know whether or not something's home in there? We aren't mind-readers. Not 
even a brain surgeon can guarantee that a patient is conscious. This is called the "other-minds" problem, 
and it's important to note that it is unlike any other problem in science having to do with the existence or 
reality of something that is unobservable. Quarks, like consciousness, cannot be observed directly, but 
there are many things that follow from quarks' existing or not existing, and those things can be 
observed. Does anything follow from the existence of consciousness, that would not follow just as readily 
if we were all Zombies who merely acted exactly as if they were conscious?
Think about it: Zombies who acted exactly as if they were conscious: Acted for how long? Well, for a 
lifetime obviously. And what does "exactly" mean? It means that there is no way to tell them apart from 
one of us based on anything they do. Zombies are functionally equivalent to and functionally 
indistinguishable from ourselves.
"So cut them apart," you say, "and check what's inside. If it's different from what's in us, that's still an 
observable difference, and we could conclude from that that they were just unconscious Zombies."
But could we really draw that conclusion if they were made of different stuff? What if they came from 
another planet: Would the fact that their innards were different be enough to convince you that they 
didn't feel pain when they were pinched and screamed? Would you yourself like to submit to such a 
verdict on another planet?
Or would you feel more comfortable pronouncing such a verdict if they didn't come from another planet, 
but were built in a lab here on earth?  Is there something about that that guarantees that their screams 
are not genuine? If you feel there is, then you must feel that you know something about the solution to 
the second philosophical problem, the mind/body problem:
What is consciousness? Let us assume that, whatever it is, it isn't an extra "force" in nature, on a par 
with electricity or gravity, for otherwise all our thoughts would be telekinetic, mind moving matter, and 
high energy psychic forces would be duelling with their "duals," high energy physics forces, not only in 
the world as a whole, but in the Academy in particular, with the prize being the truth or falsity of the 
laws of energy conservation and perhaps even causality itself.
So we will assume, instead, that consciousness is not an autonomous force, but some property or aspect 
of the ordinary physical forces we already know. If so, then it is incumbent on anyone who thinks he can tell the Zombie from the real thing that he be able to say what this property is. This is a notoriously 
difficult thing to do; in fact, I'm willing to bet it's impossible, and will even say why:
Pick a property. Any property. It can be anatomical, physiological, chemical or even "functional." 
Suppose that that property is what determines whether or not something is conscious. Now answer the 
following two questions:
(1) How could you ever determine whether that supposition -- that that's the property that distinguishes 
conscious things from unconscious ones -- was correct? That's the other-minds problem again.
But now let's suppose that the supposition -- that that's the property that distinguishes conscious things 
from unconscious ones -- was, miraculously, true, even though there was no way we could know it was 
true:
(2) In what, specifically, would its truth consist? What is it that something would lack if it lacked 
consciousness yet had the property you picked out? For if you pick anything other than consciousness 
itself as the thing it would lack if it lacked that property that was supposed to be the determinant of 
consciousness (which would be a bit circular), then one can always say: why can't it have that property 
without the consciousness? And no one has even the faintest inkling of what could count as a satisfactory 
answer to that question.
Console yourself with the fact that you are not alone, in facing this problem. It's not just centuries of 
philosophers who have wrestled with it in vain (and don't let anyone tell you the problem's only as old as 
Descartes, or that it's Descartes' fault, or anything like that: the problem of mind is as old as philosophy 
and it besets anyone who reflects on the nature of the mind): In particular, it is not only neurosurgeons, 
experimental psychologists, and ordinary people who are not mind-readers: The Blind Watchmaker (Who 
designed us though trial and error based on random mutations and their consequences for survival and 
reproduction) is no mind-reader either. He could not have let the conscious ones through and exclude the 
Zombies, because the two are functionally equivalent and functionally indistinguishable, and survival and 
reproduction are purely functional matters!
So what's a scientist to do, if he makes the mistake of staking out the mind as his terrain of inquiry? If 
the other-minds and mind/body problem are insoluble, does that mean that the mind is not scientifically 
investigable?
Only that it cannot be investigated directly, the way most things are investigated. It can be investigated 
indirectly, however, and perhaps eventually cornered by a series of approximations. Consider that we 
have been pretty cavalier about the problem of designing a Zombie: Doing it is not as easy as imagining 
it. There are plenty of formidable scientific problems to solve before we need to begin worrying about 
whether or not the functionally equivalent Zombies we've designed are conscious: We first have to 
generate their functional capacities.
Actually, I think scientific mind-theory is better described as reverse bioengineering: Ordinary 
engineering applies basic physics and engineering principles to the design of systems with certain 
functional capacities that are useful to us [bridges, ovens, planes, computers], whereas a scientific 
theory of mind would first have to successful second-guess what gives creatures like us, already ready-
made by the Blind Watchmaker, our functional capacities.
So the road ahead of us is pretty clear for the time being, even though we have reason to believe there 
is a cloud at the end of it. For now, we need to devote our time and ingenuity to second-guessing those 
functional capacities until we manage to scale up to a Zombie. It should be some consolation that the 
usual rules of scientific inquiry are in effect for the functional part of our quest. It's easy to reverse-
engineer a few isolated pieces of our functional capacity, and there are many different ways to do it, but 
as the functional chunk we take on gets bigger and bigger, the number of different ways it can be 
successfully generated gets smaller and smaller.  
This is ordinary scientific underdetermination: You can always predict and explain a small body of data in 
lots of ways, most or all of which have nothing to do with reality. But as you predict and explain more 
and more data, your degrees of freedom shrink and your theory gets more powerful and general. The 
hope, in all areas of science, is that when it is complete, and predicts and explains all observable data, 
then your theory will have converged on reality; it will be the true theory of the way things are. It might 
not be. Perhaps there will be another theory that explains it all too, and there won't be any way to know 
which one's true. (Even picking the simpler theory, if one of them is simpler than the other, may not be 
the right choice, because the world may simply not happen to be the simplest one it might have been, while still preserving all appearances.)
This is very much the way I think it will be at the end of the day (or at the end of the road, rather, if we 
stick to our previous metaphor), when we have reverse-engineered a complete Zombie, functionally 
equivalent to and functionally indistinguishable from us in any way.  There is of course the possibility 
that there will be several, radically different, but equally successful Zombie designs. Cutting them (and 
ourselves) up, at that point, may be the only remaining way to narrow down the differences. We could 
insist that in the case of the reverse engineering of the mind, "all the observable data" means not only 
all the behavioral data, but all the neural data too, and we may want to put our money only on the 
Zombie that is indistinguishable from us in both respects.
I somehow doubt that will be necessary though. I really think that the task of generating our full Zombie 
capacity probably already narrows the degrees of freedom enough to exclude all nonconscious 
candidates. I draw some solace, for example, from the fact to which I have already drawn attention, 
namely, that the "forward engineer" (the Blind Watchmaker) whose work we are reverse engineering had 
nothing stronger to go by either. But does this mean that the mind/body problem is really just another 
example of scientific underdermination that will be settled by whatever candidate makes it to the home 
stretch at the end of the day?
Not quite. For that would be all there was to it if consciousness were like quarks, that other example of 
an unobservable that I mentioned earlier. One can, without too much loss of sleep, accept that if the 
winning theory says there are quarks -- because with quarks it can predict and explain all the observable 
data, whereas without them it can't -- then it's safe to accept that there are indeed quarks.  
But I have to remind you that our complete reverse engineering theory, the one that generates our full 
Zombie capacity, will be entirely mute about consciousness, and will be just as capable of predicting and 
explaining all the observable data with or without the supposition that the Zombie is conscious.
Perhaps another way of putting it is that the complete Zombie theory will explain all the data except one: 
The fact of the existence of consciousness itself. This fact is at the heart (or rather the mind) of the very 
idea of "observation," and it's a fact that each of us can "observe" to be true in his own particular case.
So clearly the Zombie theory has left something out. Hence there is still something different here, 
something special about the mind/body problem, and something that eludes a scientific theory of mind 
unlike anything analogous in a scientific theory of matter. Maybe it's safe to assume that consciousness 
will somehow piggyback on Zombie capacity; maybe not. It might be some consolation that if it doesn't, 
we can never hope to be the wiser. But I think it's nothing to lose sleep about, at least not for a long 
time to come.
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